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______ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 A class of inmates sentenced to death by the State of 
Delaware and named plaintiff Robert W. Jackson, III 
(collectively referred to in this opinion as “Plaintiffs”), appeal 
from the District Court’s denial of their motion to reopen and 
their motion for a stay of Jackson’s execution.  After careful 
review, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion, and, accordingly, we affirm. 
I. 
A.  Facts 
 This is our second encounter with a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
challenge related to Delaware’s lethal injection protocol.  
Much of the background factual information in this case is the 
same as we recounted in Jackson v. Danberg, 594 F.3d 210 
(3d Cir. 2010) (“Jackson I”), and so we only will briefly 
outline that background material before setting forth in more 
detail those facts essential to the resolution of this appeal. 
 Delaware law provides that: 
[p]unishment of death shall, in all cases, be 
inflicted by intravenous injection of a substance 
or substances in a lethal quantity sufficient to 
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cause death and until such person sentenced to 
death is dead, and such execution procedure 
shall be determined and supervised by the 
Commissioner of the Department of Correction. 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(f) (2006 Supp.).  The 
statute does not mandate the use of any particular drug or 
series of drugs. 
 On August 29, 2008, the Delaware Department of 
Correction (“DDOC”) instituted a new lethal injection 
protocol (“2008 Protocol”).  The protocol calls for the 
sequential intravenous (“IV”) injection of three chemicals 
into an inmate’s bloodstream.  The first chemical is sodium 
thiopental, which renders an inmate unconscious.  The second 
chemical is pancuronium bromide, a muscle relaxant that acts 
as a paralytic agent.  The third and final chemical is 
potassium chloride, which induces cardiac arrest and causes 
the inmate’s death.  The 2008 Protocol also calls for the IV 
team, consisting of two people who may have at least one 
year of professional experience,1 to examine the inmate to 
ensure he is unconscious before the pancuronium bromide is 
administered.  The consciousness check requires the warden 
to call the inmate’s name out loud to observe any reaction 
from the inmate.  At the same time, a member of the IV team 
assesses the inmate’s consciousness by touching the inmate, 
shaking his shoulder, and brushing his eyelashes.  If the 
 
1 Those specialists include a certified medical assistant, 
a phlebotomist, an emergency medical technician, a 
paramedic, and a military corpsman. 
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inmate is not unconscious, the protocol requires the execution 
team to repeat the administration of the first chemical and 
subsequent consciousness checks until the inmate is deemed 
unconscious. 
 Delaware amended its protocol on May 5, 2011.  The 
amended protocol, which is before us today, includes only 
one significant difference.  Due to a nationwide shortage of 
sodium thiopental, Delaware, along with a number of other 
states, revised its protocol to allow for the use of an 
alternative barbiturate, pentobarbital, as the first chemical to 
be administered. 
B.  Procedural History 
 Jackson, a Delaware state inmate convicted of first 
degree murder and sentenced to death by the State of 
Delaware, commenced this action on May 8, 2006.  He filed a 
section 1983 action2 alleging that the State of Delaware’s 
 
2 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides, in pertinent part: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any 
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen 
of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the 
party injured[.] 
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then-existing method of lethal injection created an 
unconstitutional risk of pain and suffering, cognizable under 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution.3  The District Court certified a class under Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 23(b) consisting of all Delaware death row inmates 
and appointed class counsel.  See Jackson v. Danberg, 240 
F.R.D. 145 (D. Del. 2007). 
 During the course of litigation in the District Court, 
Defendants amended their lethal injection protocol twice.  
Ultimately, the 2008 Protocol was enacted in an effort to 
incorporate the safeguards described by the Supreme Court in 
Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008), which upheld Kentucky’s 
lethal injection protocol against a challenge under the Eighth 
Amendment.  Upon adoption of the 2008 Protocol and at the 
direction of the District Court, Defendants moved for 
summary judgment.  They argued that the 2008 Protocol fully 
complied with the mandate of Baze and that the lethal 
injection protocol, including the use of sodium thiopental, did 
not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.  The District 
Court acknowledged that the DDOC had failed to follow its 
own procedures in certain executions but held that Plaintiffs 
 
3 Jackson named the following defendants in his 
complaint: Stanley W. Taylor, Jr., Commissioner, Delaware 
Department of Correction; Thomas L. Carroll, Warden, 
Delaware Correctional Center; Paul Howard, Bureau Chief, 
Delaware Bureau of Prisons; and other unknown Delaware 
officials (collectively, “Defendants”).  In February 2007, the 
District Court substituted Taylor with his successor, Carl C. 
Danberg. 
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had not shown a “substantial risk of an inadequate dose of 
sodium thiopental.”  Jackson v. Danberg, 601 F. Supp. 2d 
589, 599 (D. Del. 2009).  The District Court granted summary 
judgment to Defendants and stayed executions pending 
appeal.  Id. 
 Plaintiffs appealed, and Defendants cross-appealed the 
stay of executions.  We affirmed the grant of summary 
judgment, applying Baze to our analysis.  Jackson I, 594 F.3d 
210.  We held that to prevail on a claim that a risk of future 
harm runs afoul of the Constitution, an inmate must 
demonstrate that “the conditions presenting the risk must be 
‘sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless 
suffering,’ and give rise to ‘sufficiently imminent dangers.’”  
Id. at 216 (quoting Baze, 553 U.S. at 50).  We noted that “the 
proper administration of sodium thiopental is an 
indispensable link in the lethal injection chain for Eighth 
Amendment purposes, as it ensures that an inmate will not 
suffer under the effects of the second two drugs.”  Id. at 225.  
In other words, although “[r]easonable people of good faith 
disagree on the morality and efficacy of capital punishment,” 
Delaware’s 2008 Protocol is not unconstitutional under 
existing Supreme Court precedent.  Id. at 230 (quoting Baze, 
553 U.S. at 61).  The Supreme Court denied certiorari on 
October 12, 2010.  Jackson v. Danberg, 131 S. Ct. 458 
(2010). 
 Shortly after Delaware changed its protocol to include 
pentobarbital as an alternative to sodium thiopental in May 
2011, Plaintiffs filed a motion to reopen under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
60(b)(6) and (d) and a motion to stay Jackson’s execution 
with the District Court.  Plaintiffs argued that the substitution 
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of pentobarbital for sodium thiopental is a factual change that 
undermines the foundations of the prior ruling, constituting an 
exceptional circumstance under Rule 60(b)(6) and a 
circumstance calling for an independent action to prevent a 
miscarriage of justice under Rule 60(d).  They relied on an 
expert report written by David B. Waisel, M.D., in support of 
their motion.  Defendants, in turn, relied on an expert report 
by Dr. Mark Dershwitz, an anesthesiologist with a Ph.D. in 
pharmacology.  The District Court denied both of Plaintiffs’ 
motions.  It found that a stay was not warranted because 
Plaintiffs had “not carried their burden to prove that they are 
likely to succeed on the merits of their Eighth Amendment 
claim.”  Jackson v. Danberg, 2011 WL 3205453, at *3 (D. 
Del. July 27, 2011).  The District Court also denied Plaintiffs’ 
motion to reopen under both Rules 60(b)(6) and 60(d), 
concluding that “the record at bar is insufficient to reopen the 
judgment entered by [it] in 2009.”  Id. at *4.  Plaintiffs timely 
appealed the judgment of the District Court and filed an 
independent motion for a stay. 
 We denied the motion to stay on July 28, 2011, and 
affirmed the judgment of the District Court with an opinion to 
follow.4  Following our decision, the Supreme Court denied 
 
4 The panel issued its order around 7:00 p.m. on 
July 28, 2011, approximately five hours before the scheduled 
time of execution. 
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certiorari, and Robert Jackson was executed just after 
midnight on July 29, 2011, by lethal injection.5 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(a)(1) to consider the appeal by Plaintiffs from the 
District Court’s denial of injunctive relief and under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 to consider the appeal by Plaintiffs from the 
District Court’s denial of relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) 
and (d).  We review a district court’s denial of a stay for 
abuse of discretion, which may be found where its conclusion 
includes the commission of a serious error of law or a mistake 
in considering the facts.  Bradley v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., 
910 F.2d 1172, 1175 (3d Cir. 1990).  We also review a 
district court’s denial of a Rule 60(b) and (d) motion to 
reopen for abuse of discretion.  Morris v. Horn, 187 F.3d 333, 
341 (3d Cir. 1999). 
III. 
A.  Stay 
 “[A] stay of execution is an equitable remedy” that “is 
not available as a matter of right, and equity must be sensitive 
to the State’s strong interest in enforcing its criminal 
judgments without undue interference from the federal 
 
5 We write on this issue as this appeal was filed on 
behalf of a class, and it impacts appellants other than Jackson. 
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courts.”  Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573, 584 (2006).  The 
standard for issuance of a stay is like that for issuance of a 
preliminary injunction, and requires consideration of four 
factors: 
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong 
showing that he is likely to succeed on the 
merits; (2) whether the applicant will be 
irreparably injured absent a stay; (3) whether 
issuance of the stay will substantially injure the 
other parties interested in the proceeding; and 
(4) where the public interest lies. 
Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987); Republic of 
Phil. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 653, 658 (3d Cir. 
1991).  In assessing these factors, we underscore that 
“inmates seeking time to challenge the manner in which the 
State plans to execute them must satisfy all of the 
requirements for a stay, including a showing of a significant 
possibility of success on the merits.”  Hill, 547 U.S. at 584. 
 Plaintiffs argue that because pentobarbital is not 
approved by the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) for 
use as an anesthetic, its performance in the three-drug 
protocol, namely its manner and timing of inducing 
unconsciousness, is unknown and unpredictable and therefore 
violative of the Eighth Amendment.  In support of their 
argument that pentobarbital renders the lethal injection 
protocol unconstitutional, Plaintiffs proffer the following 
evidence:  (1) the opinion of Dr. David Waisel, an 
anesthesiologist at Harvard Law School, who, among other 
things, has reviewed eyewitness accounts and has concluded 
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that Alabama prisoner Eddie Powell and Georgia prisoner 
Roy Blankenship were inadequately anesthetized by 
pentobarbital and suffered greatly from their executions; 
(2) the fact that pentobarbital is not approved by the FDA for 
use as an anesthetic; and (3) the fact that pentobarbital is less 
lipid-soluble than sodium thiopental and therefore does not 
cross the blood-brain barrier as quickly. 
 Plaintiffs’ challenge to the DDOC’s substitution of 
pentobarbital for sodium thiopental is governed by the 
Supreme Court’s splintered decision in Baze.  In Baze, the 
Supreme Court recognized “that subjecting individuals to a 
risk of future harm − not simply actually inflicting pain − can 
qualify as cruel and unusual punishment.”  553 U.S. at 49.  
However, to constitute a violation of the Eighth Amendment, 
“the conditions presenting the risk must be ‘sure or very 
likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering,’ and 
give rise to ‘sufficiently imminent dangers.’”  Id. at 50 
(quoting Helling, 509 U.S. at 34-35).  “Simply because an 
execution method may result in pain, either by accident or as 
an inescapable consequence of death, does not establish the 
sort of ‘objectively intolerable risk of harm’ that qualifies as 
cruel and unusual.”  Id.  Rather, a stay of execution may only 
be granted where “the condemned prisoner establishes that 
the State’s lethal injection protocol creates a demonstrated 
risk of severe pain . . . [and] that the risk is substantial when 
compared to the known and available alternatives.”  Id. at 61. 
 The District Court, applying the Baze principles, 
concluded that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the 
substitution of pentobarbital resulted in a constitutionally 
unacceptable risk of pain and suffering.  It noted that 
 
12 
Delaware’s protocol calls for the administration of five grams 
of pentobarbital, which on its own is a lethal dose according 
to Dr. Dershwitz.  Moreover, the Delaware protocol calls for 
a consciousness check after two minutes have lapsed, 
followed by the administration of a second dose of 
pentobarbital if the inmate is still conscious after two 
minutes.  Based upon these factual findings and procedural 
safeguards, the District Court concluded that Plaintiffs had 
not presented “affirmative evidence . . . that the 
administration of pentobarbital as the first drug in Delaware’s 
three-drug protocol creates a demonstrated risk of severe 
pain, as required by the Supreme Court.”  Jackson, 2011 WL 
3205453, at *3.  In other words, the District Court concluded 
that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on 
the merits and accordingly denied the stay. 
 After conducting our own searching review of the 
record, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Plaintiffs’ motion for a stay.  The 
District Court’s factual findings are supported by the 
testimony of Defendants’ expert, Dr. Dershwitz.  The purpose 
of the anesthetic in Delaware’s lethal injection protocol is to 
render the inmate unconscious before administration of the 
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second and third drugs, and there is no affirmative evidence 
that pentobarbital fails to do this.6 
 
6 Jackson urges us to consider Georgia’s execution of 
Roy Blankenship and Alabama’s execution of Eddie Powell 
as affirmative evidence that pentobarbital fails to properly 
anesthetize inmates.  Dr. Waisel, who formulated his opinion 
based on witnesses’ accounts of the execution and some 
movement by the inmates during the initial three minutes at 
the start of the execution process, expressed concern that 
Blankenship and Powell were insufficiently anesthetized.  
Witnesses described these executions in contradictory ways.  
For example: 
To some, Blankenship was just looking up and 
watching what was occurring, looked at his left 
arm (which had an IV saline drip) and then 30 
to 60 seconds later looked toward his right arm 
where the administration of the pentobarbital 
was starting.  To others, Blankenship appeared 
to grimace, or have a startled face, or jerked his 
arm twice, or had his mouth open and tried to 
mouth something. 
 
DeYoung, 2011 WL 2899704, at *5.  Under Georgia’s 
protocol, the execution could not proceed until a 
consciousness check was performed.  The District Court was 
not persuaded by this equivocal evidence of consciousness in 
the face of strict procedural safeguards, and we see no abuse 
of discretion in its conclusion. 
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 Indeed each court to consider this issue has uniformly 
held that the use of pentobarbital in lieu of sodium thiopental 
is constitutional.7  See, e.g., DeYoung v. Owens, --- F.3d ---, 
2011 WL 2899704, at *3 (11th Cir. July 20, 2011); Powell v. 
Thomas, 641 F.3d 1255, 1257 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); 
Pavatt v. Jones, 627 F.3d 1336 (10th Cir. 2010).  For 
example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit approved a protocol virtually identical to Delaware’s 
after allowing an Oklahoma death-sentenced inmate to 
conduct discovery, submit an expert report, and hold an 
evidentiary hearing.  Pavatt, 627 F.3d at 1338-40.  In Pavatt, 
the district court considered evidence that:  (1) the first step of 
Oklahoma’s lethal injection protocol mandates the 
intravenous administration of five grams of pentobarbital; 
(2) the protocol requires the attending physician to ensure that 
the inmate is sufficiently unconscious prior to the 
administration of the paralytic agent; (3) the administration of 
a sufficient dose of pentobarbital will render an individual 
unconscious; (4) the defendant’s expert witness, Dr. 
Dershwitz, testified that the five-gram dosage will ensure that 
the inmate does not feel the effects of the paralytic agent; and 
(5) Dr. Dershwitz responded to Dr. Waisel’s testimony by 
pointing out that the use of pentobarbital to induce a 
barbiturate coma takes the patient to a state of 
unconsciousness beyond a normal clinical level of anesthesia.  
 
7 While these cases are not controlling, it is noteworthy 
that the expert reports before the District Court here were 
written by the same experts utilized in the other courts of 
appeals cases. 
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Id. at 1339.  At the conclusion of the hearing, the district 
court denied the motion for a stay, concluding that the 
prisoner failed to establish a substantial likelihood of success 
on the merits of his Eighth Amendment challenge. 
 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit held that the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying a stay.  Specifically, 
the Tenth Circuit observed that Dr. Dershwitz had 
“substantially more clinical experience with the use of 
pentobarbital than Dr. Waisel.”  Id. at 1340.  The court also 
noted the importance of the consciousness check to its 
analysis, and held that the inmate “failed to establish a 
substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his Eighth 
Amendment challenge to the . . . revised protocol.”  Id.; see 
also DeYoung, 2011 WL 2899704, at *6 (“DeYoung has 
wholly failed to show that pentobarbital, once fully 
administered and allowed to act, is ineffective as an 
anesthetic.”);8 Powell, 641 F.3d at 1257-58 (approving the 
substitution of pentobarbital for sodium thiopental).  We 
agree with the Tenth Circuit’s approach and likewise 
conclude that Plaintiffs cannot establish that pentobarbital is 
 
8 Plaintiffs’ assertion that the Eleventh Circuit’s denial 
of DeYoung’s claims was based entirely on Georgia’s two-
year statute of limitations is only partially correct.  DeYoung, 
2011 WL 2899704, at *3.  The court engaged in a thorough 
analysis of the merits of DeYoung’s claims and held in the 
alternative that “even if [DeYoung’s claims] were timely, 
they fail as a matter of law . . . because [he] has not 
established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of 
his claims.”  Id. 
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“sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless 
suffering.”  Baze, 553 U.S. at 50 (quoting Helling, 509 U.S. at 
34-35). 
 Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the District Court 
misapplied the legal rubric of Baze by failing to engage in an 
additional inquiry with respect to their execution challenge: a 
comparative risk analysis.  According to Plaintiffs, the 
District Court was required to consider the comparative risks 
of “known and available alternatives” to Delaware’s 
pentobarbital three-drug protocol.  Specifically, they argue 
the District Court should have considered the comparative 
risk of (1) a known anesthetic drug with a proven track 
record, for use as the first drug in the three-drug protocol, or 
(2) a single-drug execution protocol.9 
Plaintiffs’ argument misstates the law.  “[A] 
condemned prisoner cannot successfully challenge a State’s 
method of execution merely by showing a slightly or 
marginally safer alternative.”  Baze, 553 U.S. at 51.  Rather, 
 
9 With respect to the second option, Dr. Dershwitz 
testified that a five-gram dose of a barbiturate such as sodium 
thiopental or pentobarbital would cause death in all people, 
and that death would occur as quickly as five minutes from 
the injection.  Ohio has used a one-drug protocol since 
November 2009, and Washington adopted a one-drug 
protocol on March 2, 2010, but permits condemned inmates 
to select the method.  See Death Penalty Information Ctr., 
Authorized Methods, 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/methods-execution. 
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an inmate must first show that a state’s current protocol 
creates a “demonstrated risk of severe pain.”  Id. at 61.  
Moreover, Delaware is not “compelled to change its lethal 
injection protocol simply because another state has elected to 
do so.”  Jackson I, 594 F.3d at 228.  We recognize that the 
one-drug protocol is gaining support as an alternative to the 
three-drug lethal injection protocol, and we commend those 
states steadily striving to develop more humane alternatives 
to existing methods of execution.  However, federal courts are 
not “boards of inquiry charged with determining ‘best 
practices’ for executions.”  Baze, 553 U.S. at 51. 
“Pentobarbital is a barbiturate commonly used to 
euthanize terminally ill patients who seek death with dignity 
in states such as Oregon and Washington.”  Beaty v. Brewer, 
--- F.3d. ---, 2011 WL 2040916, at *4 (9th Cir. 2011) 
(denying rehearing en banc because inmate had no likelihood 
of success on Eighth Amendment claim based on 
pentobarbital).  It has been used successfully for executions in 
at least four other states, and there is no evidence that it fails 
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to render an inmate unconscious.10  Id.  The District Court did 
not abuse its discretion in finding that the use of pentobarbital 
did not create “a demonstrated risk of severe pain, as required 
by the Supreme Court.”  Jackson, 2011 WL 3205453, at *3.  
Thus, we affirm the District Court’s denial of the stay.11 
B.  60(b)(6) and 60(d) 
 
10 Plaintiffs also assert that Defendants’ use of 
pentobarbital is violative of the Eighth Amendment because it 
evinces Defendants’ deliberate indifference to the potential 
pain and suffering he will undergo.  We have previously held 
that Baze did not import the “deliberate indifference” 
standard to lethal injection challenges.  See Jackson I, 594 
F.3d at 223 n.16.  Instead, the Baze Court held that “there 
must be a ‘substantial risk of serious harm,’ an ‘objectively 
intolerable risk of harm’ that prevents prison officials from 
pleading that they were ‘subjectively blameless for purposes 
of the Eighth Amendment.’”  Baze, 553 U.S. at 50 (quoting 
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842, 846, & n.9 (1994)).  
Even if this language did graft the deliberate indifference 
standard onto lethal injection challenges, because we 
conclude that there was no “substantial risk of serious harm,” 
we also conclude that there could have been no deliberate 
indifference to that alleged risk. 
11 Because we conclude that Plaintiffs have not 
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, we need 
not address the other factors required for a stay of an 
execution. 
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 Rule 60(b)(6) relief from judgment is only granted in 
extraordinary circumstances.  See Martinez-McBean v. Govt. 
of Virgin Islands, 562 F.2d 908, 911-12 (3d Cir. 1977).12  It is 
available where the party seeking relief demonstrates that 
“extreme” and “unexpected” hardship will result absent such 
relief.  United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 
(1932).  Similarly, Rule 60(d) permits a court to entertain an 
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment in order 
to “prevent a grave miscarriage of justice.”  United States v. 
Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 47 (1998). 
Plaintiffs claim that the addition of pentobarbital as an 
available alternative to sodium thiopental is such a 
circumstance.  In making this argument, Plaintiffs urge that 
the use of sodium thiopental was central to our decision in 
Jackson I, and that the substitution of an alternative 
barbiturate undermines the very foundation of our decision. 
In Jackson I, we held that Delaware’s three-drug 
protocol did not violate the Eighth Amendment, and stated 
that “the proper administration of sodium thiopental is an 
indispensable link in the lethal injection chain for Eighth 
Amendment purposes, as it ensures that an inmate will not 
suffer under the effects of the second two drugs.”  594 F.3d at 
225.  However, the import of both Baze and Jackson I is that 
use of an effective anesthetic as the first drug in a three-drug 
 
12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) provides, in pertinent part: 
“On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its 
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for . . . any . . . reason that justifies relief.” 
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protocol is required to satisfy the Eighth Amendment.  In 
other words, “[t]he proper administration of the first drug 
[must] ensure[] that the prisoner does not experience any pain 
associated with the paralysis and cardiac arrest caused by the 
second and third drugs.”  Baze, 553 U.S. at 44. 
We cannot say that the District Court’s finding that 
pentobarbital is an effective anesthetic for purposes of the 
three-drug lethal injection is clearly erroneous, particularly 
based on its demonstrated uses and the testimony of Dr. 
Dershwitz.  Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court 
did not abuse its discretion in denying Plaintiffs’ motion to 
reopen, and we agree that “the substitution of pentobarbital 
for sodium thiopental does not constitute a factual change 
which undermines the foundation of [the] prior ruling,” 
necessitating independent action under either Rule 60(b)(6) or 
60(d).  Jackson, 2011 WL 3205453, at *4.13 
IV. 
 
13 We also conclude that the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in declining to grant an evidentiary 
hearing on the matter.  Having presided over the entire case 
and being intimately familiar with the record to date as well 
as the submissions regarding pentobarbital, the District Court 
was well-situated to rule on the motion to reopen and the 
motion for the stay, and additional discovery would not 
further illuminate the issue at bar.  See United States v. Hines, 
628 F.3d 101, 104 (3d Cir. 2010) (setting forth the standard of 
review). 
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For all of these reasons, we conclude that Plaintiffs 
have not demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on 
the merits of their claims, and that the District Court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying a stay of Jackson’s execution 
and Plaintiffs’ motion to reopen.  Accordingly, we will 
affirm. 
